A familiar darkness is once again descending upon Pakistan, a shadow that lengthens and shortens with the political climate but never truly recedes. The resurgence of sectarian violence, a malignant force that attacks the nation’s foundational cohesion, is no longer a peripheral threat but a clear and present danger. From targeted killings on city streets to the digital amplification of hatred, identity-based violence is reasserting its grim presence. This revival is not a sudden eruption but the symptom of a chronic disease, one that has been alternately ignored, mismanaged, and at times, cynically exploited. The state’s response, a patchwork of kinetic actions and rhetorical commitments, remains fundamentally insufficient to confront the ideological and structural roots of this peril, leaving society vulnerable to the forces that seek to tear it asunder.
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The genesis of this conflict is deeply embedded in the nation's history. While theological differences have existed for centuries, their transformation into a violent political phenomenon was a product of specific state policies and geopolitical currents. The 1980s marked a decisive turning point. The state’s active involvement in the Afghan jihad, coupled with a deliberate program of Islamization at home, injected a rigid and exclusionary interpretation of faith into the body politic. This process was not neutral; it actively favoured certain sects while marginalizing others, most notably the Shia community. Institutions were created, laws were amended, and a new, more severe public piety was enforced. This period saw the proliferation of religious seminaries funded by rival powers, turning Pakistan into a battleground for a proxy war fought along sectarian lines. Groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan emerged from this crucible, institutionalizing anti-Shia rhetoric and violence. The state’s patronage, or at the very least its calculated tolerance of these elements for strategic purposes, created monsters that would later prove difficult to control.
Today, the drivers of sectarian unrest have evolved, becoming more complex and multifaceted. The historical grievances remain, but they are now inflamed by a potent combination of socio-economic despair, political opportunism, and technological acceleration. In vast swathes of the country, crippling poverty, chronic unemployment, and a failing education system create a fertile recruiting ground for extremist organizations. For young men with few prospects and even less hope, the allure of a powerful identity, a sense of purpose, and the promise of salvation or financial reward can be irresistible. A sociological analysis of regions like Sukkur Division reveals a stark correlation between deprivation and conflict, with a survey finding that 31.5 percent of respondents identified illiteracy as a key socioeconomic driver of violence. These are not merely criminals, but disenfranchised individuals made vulnerable to radical ideologies that provide simplistic answers to complex problems.
Compounding this is the persistent and cynical manipulation of sectarian sentiments by political actors. A study of community perceptions found that 45 percent of residents in a conflict-prone area believed political manipulation was a primary cause of sectarian violence. Religious identity is often instrumentalized to build vote banks, undermine rivals, or create localized disturbances for political gain. This creates a permissive environment where hate speech goes unchecked and extremist leaders are courted for their ability to mobilize supporters. The line between mainstream politics and sectarian activism becomes dangerously blurred, lending a veneer of legitimacy to groups that should be on the fringes of society. When the state itself is seen as an inconsistent or biased arbiter, it loses the moral authority required to act as a unifying force.
The modern accelerant for this toxic mix is the digital realm. Social media has become the new frontier for sectarian conflict, a largely ungoverned space where hate speech, disinformation, and incitement can spread with terrifying speed and efficiency. Clerics with millions of followers can broadcast divisive sermons, trolls can launch coordinated harassment campaigns, and graphic content can be used to provoke outrage and retaliatory violence. A recent study found that a staggering 89 percent of social media users who engaged in sectarian hate speech or other violations reported never being contacted by any law enforcement agency. This digital impunity allows extremist narratives to become entrenched, creating echo chambers that radicalize individuals far more effectively than traditional methods ever could. As the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) noted in its 2024 report, social media platforms are now widely used to incite violence and circulate fake news about alleged blasphemy, often with deadly consequences.
In the face of this resurgent threat, the state’s response has been defined by a fundamental strategic flaw: an over-reliance on coercive measures at the expense of addressing the underlying ideological and social drivers. Following the horrific Army Public School attack in 2014, the state formulated the National Action Plan (NAP), a 20-point agenda intended to be a comprehensive framework for countering terrorism and extremism. Several of its points directly targeted sectarianism, including pledges to prosecute and stop elements spreading sectarian violence, and to ensure that banned outfits would not be allowed to operate under different names.
Yet, a decade later, the implementation of these crucial points remains profoundly wanting. An assessment of NAP’s effectiveness concluded that it has been only “partially” successful, with a strong focus on hard measures like military operations while the soft measures needed to counter extremist ideology have been neglected. The state has demonstrated its capacity to conduct kinetic operations against militant groups, but it has shown little aptitude or will for the more difficult, long-term work of winning hearts and minds. The result is a temporary suppression of violence, not its eradication. The extremist ideology, left unchallenged, simply waits for the next opportunity to manifest.
The failure to prevent proscribed organizations from re-emerging under new names is a particularly stark example of this implementation gap. Militant sectarian groups, though officially banned, continue their activities with impunity by simply changing their letterheads. For instance, the notoriously violent Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) has been known to operate as Millat-e-Islami Pakistan (MIP), among other aliases. This shell game is an open secret, made possible by a lack of sustained political will to enforce the law without fear or favour. It sends a message that the state’s prohibitions are merely cosmetic, designed to appease international pressure rather than to bring about genuine change.
Furthermore, the criminal justice system remains one of the weakest links in the state’s counter-sectarian strategy. The path from arrest to conviction is fraught with obstacles, including poor evidence collection, witness intimidation, and a judiciary that is often either overburdened or reluctant to handle sensitive cases. Perpetrators of sectarian violence frequently evade justice, which fosters a deep-seated culture of impunity. This was tragically highlighted in the aftermath of the Jaranwala mob attack and other incidents where, as the HRCP has documented, there is a consistent lack of accountability for perpetrators of mob violence. When individuals and groups believe they can incite hatred and commit violence without consequence, they are emboldened to continue. The state’s failure to deliver justice not only denies relief to victims but also erodes public trust in its ability and willingness to protect all its citizens equally.
The cost of this continued failure is measured in human lives and the erosion of the social fabric. In 2023 alone, there were numerous religiously motivated attacks, with civil society organizations documenting the killings of at least 16 persons for their faith, including seven Shia Muslims. Attacks on the Hazara community in Balochistan resumed after a two-year. These are not just statistics; they represent a society fracturing along its most sensitive fault lines. Every targeted killing, every desecrated place of worship, and every online threat deepens the chasm of mistrust and fear between communities.
Confronting the specter of sectarianism requires a paradigm shift in the state’s approach. It must move beyond a reactive, security-centric model and adopt a holistic strategy that addresses the phenomenon in its entirety. This begins with an unwavering commitment to the rule of law, applied consistently to all who preach hatred and violence, regardless of their political connections or street power. The re-emergence of banned organizations under new banners must be met with decisive legal and administrative action.
Simultaneously, the state must wage a determined ideological battle. This involves reforming public education to promote critical thinking and religious tolerance, regulating religious seminaries to ensure they are not incubators of extremism, and developing a powerful counter-narrative that champions a pluralistic and inclusive national identity. It requires empowering moderate religious voices and using the same media platforms now dominated by extremists to disseminate messages of harmony and coexistence.
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Finally, addressing the socio-economic despair that fuels radicalization is indispensable. Long-term investment in education, healthcare, and economic opportunities in marginalized communities is not a matter of social welfare, but of national security. A young person with a stake in the system, a quality education, and the prospect of a dignified livelihood is far less likely to fall prey to the siren song of extremism.
The resurgence of identity-based violence is a test of the Pakistani state’s viability and its commitment to the foundational promise of protecting all its citizens. Allowing this cancer to metastasize further is not an option. Without a sincere, comprehensive, and sustained effort to dismantle the infrastructure of hate, the cycle of violence will continue, threatening to consume the very soul of the nation.
