The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, particularly its Kashmir theater, evokes potent memories of military valor juxtaposed with profound strategic questions. While Pakistani soldiers demonstrated remarkable courage and achieved initial successes, the assertion that victory was within grasp only to be squandered by the "stuck brain" of Field Marshal Ayub Khan simplifies a multifaceted conflict. A nuanced analysis reveals that while battlefield momentum was undeniably strong, a comprehensive assessment must consider the broader military and diplomatic context that shaped these pivotal events and their ultimate consequences for the Kashmir dispute.
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The strategic importance of Akhnur, a town controlling the vital bridge over the Chenab River and the primary supply route to Indian forces in Naushera, Rajouri, and Poonch sectors of Jammu and Kashmir, was undeniable. Operation Grand Slam, launched on September 1, 1965, aimed squarely at its capture. The initial phases, spearheaded by forces under Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, were remarkably successful. Pakistani troops advanced rapidly, breaking through Indian defenses and instilling a sense of crisis within the Indian military command. The fall of Akhnur appeared imminent, an outcome that could have significantly altered the military balance in Kashmir and potentially forced India into a more conciliatory stance on the dispute.
The Fateful Decisions Shaping the Outcome
The trajectory of the 1965 war, particularly concerning the potential capture of Akhnur and its aftermath, was significantly influenced by key decisions that continue to be debated for their strategic wisdom and impact.
The Command Change at a Crucial Juncture
One of the most contentious decisions of the war was the replacement of Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC of the 12th Division, with Major General Yahya Khan as commander of the Akhnur offensive on the night of September 1/2, 1965. General Malik had meticulously planned and launched Operation Grand Slam, and his forces were making swift progress. The sudden change in command, at the very moment when momentum was peaking, is widely believed to have caused a critical operational pause of at least 24 to 36 hours. This hiatus allegedly allowed Indian forces vital time to reinforce Akhnur's defenses and redeploy troops. Various explanations have been offered for this change: Ayub Khan's alleged desire to give Yahya Khan, a favored general, the "glory" of capturing Akhnur; concerns that Malik, a dynamic Ahmadi officer, might become too powerful or popular; or simply a pre-planned administrative decision executed at an inopportune moment. Regardless of the rationale, military analysts like Shuja Nawaz in "Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within," have pointed to this decision as a significant factor that potentially stalled the advance and prevented the capture of Akhnur when it was most vulnerable. The argument persists that had Malik been allowed to continue, his momentum might have carried the day.
India's Broad Front Retaliation
While the focus often remains on Akhnur, India's strategic response fundamentally altered the war's complexion. On September 6, 1965, India launched a full-scale offensive across the international border in Punjab, targeting Lahore and Sialkot. This escalation was a direct consequence of Pakistan's advances in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector towards Akhnur. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's decision to open new fronts was a calculated move to relieve pressure on Kashmir and threaten Pakistan's heartland. This compelled Pakistan to divert significant military resources, including armor and infantry formations originally earmarked for or supporting the Kashmir operations, to defend its vital territories. Even if Akhnur had fallen, the wider war on the Punjab front would have presented Pakistan with immense challenges, stretching its military capabilities and resources to their limits. This broader Indian strategy significantly constrained Pakistan's ability to consolidate any potential gains in Kashmir.
The Tashkent Declaration A Difficult Compromise
Following a UN-brokered ceasefire on September 23, 1965, President Ayub Khan met Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in Tashkent, Soviet Union, in January 1966, under Soviet mediation. The Tashkent Declaration stipulated that both sides would withdraw their forces to the positions they held prior to August 5, 1965, effectively meaning a return to the pre-war status quo. For Pakistan, this meant relinquishing any territory gained during the conflict, including areas captured in the Chhamb sector en route to Akhnur. Ayub Khan's agreement to these terms was met with widespread public anger and disillusionment in Pakistan, where the official narrative had projected a near-victory. Many felt that successes achieved by the military, particularly the advances towards Akhnur, were "lost" at the negotiating table. Ayub Khan defended his decision by citing mounting international pressure, the economic strain of the war, and the risk of prolonged conflict with a larger adversary. He argued that the Tashkent agreement, while not ideal, prevented further losses and allowed Pakistan to regroup. However, critics, including Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who resigned as Foreign Minister shortly thereafter, contended that Ayub Khan had buckled under pressure and failed to leverage Pakistan's battlefield performance to secure any concessions on Kashmir.
The Uncaptured Prize and its Political Fallout
The failure to capture Akhnur, coupled with the terms of the Tashkent Declaration, had profound political consequences within Pakistan. It fueled a narrative of a "won war lost by diplomacy," contributing to the decline of Ayub Khan's popularity and authority. The perception that a decisive victory in Kashmir was within reach, only to be squandered by leadership decisions, resonated deeply and contributed to the political unrest that eventually led to Ayub's downfall in 1969. The sacrifices of the soldiers, particularly those who fought and died in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector, were seen by many as having been in vain due to decisions made far from the battlefield. The Tashkent agreement offered no progress on the core Kashmir dispute, leaving it to fester and contribute to future conflicts.
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The assertion that Pakistani soldiers had "almost succeeded" in occupying Kashmir, primarily through the near capture of Akhnur, holds significant emotional weight and contains elements of truth regarding battlefield momentum. However, "occupying Kashmir" was a far larger objective than capturing a single town, however strategic. The command change was undeniably disruptive. Yet, even if Akhnur had fallen, sustaining that gain and translating it into a broader resolution of the Kashmir dispute, especially after India opened new fronts, would have been a monumental challenge. The Tashkent Declaration, viewed by many in Pakistan as a capitulation, must also be seen in the context of intense international pressure and the limitations of Pakistan's capacity for a prolonged, multi-front war.
The 1965 war, and specifically the Akhnur offensive, represents a complex chapter in Pakistan's history. The valor of Pakistani soldiers brought them close to a significant tactical victory at Akhnur, which could have had major strategic implications for the Kashmir conflict. The controversial decision to change military command at a critical moment undoubtedly impacted the operational tempo. Subsequently, the Tashkent Declaration, which mandated a return to pre-war lines, was perceived by many in Pakistan as a diplomatic failure that nullified the military's hard-won gains. While the "won almost succeeded Kashmir" narrative is potent, it simplifies the intricate interplay of military operations, enemy responses, international diplomacy, and national capacity. The failure to achieve a decisive outcome in Kashmir in 1965 was likely a result of a confluence of factors: operational missteps like the command change, India's strategic counter-escalation, and the geopolitical realities that shaped the Tashkent negotiations, rather than solely the fault of any single decision or individual.
