The story of Pakistan’s democratic journey has been shaped not only by the weight of its institutions but also by the decline of civilian supremacy. What was once a hopeful experiment in parliamentary democracy quickly became entangled in the politics of power retention, factional rivalries, and institutional imbalance. While civil-military relations have dominated discourse, the internal disunity among civilian forces and their inability to assert control over the state’s key levers played an equally damaging role in the erosion of democratic space.
Follow CPF WhatsApp Channel for Daily Exam Updates
Led by Sir Syed Kazim Ali, Cssprepforum helps 70,000+ aspirants monthly with top-tier CSS/PMS content. Follow our WhatsApp Channel for solved past papers, expert articles, and free study resources shared by qualifiers and high scorers.
When Pakistan came into being, its founding leadership was tasked with nation-building from scratch. The sudden death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 and the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 created a political vacuum. These formative years were critical, yet instead of developing a strong political culture rooted in inclusivity and constitutionalism, rival factions within the Muslim League and provincial elites competed for influence. Between 1947 and 1958, Pakistan had seven prime ministers and numerous cabinet reshuffles, reflecting deep instability within the civilian political class. Rather than strengthening parliamentary procedures and democratic norms, leaders prioritized personal or factional gains, often seeking the support of the civil bureaucracy or military to sideline opponents.
This internal dysfunction provided a fertile ground for non-elected institutions to assert their authority. The civil bureaucracy, under the stewardship of Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza, began acting as power brokers. Rather than being neutral administrators, they shaped political outcomes, dismissed elected governments, and aligned closely with the military. The dismissal of Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin in 1953 by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, despite enjoying the confidence of the assembly, marked a critical precedent where unelected officials overrode constitutional authority. The 1958 coup by General Ayub Khan only formalized a process already underway, where civilians had steadily ceded control.
Yet even under military regimes, the role of civilians remained problematic. While military rulers such as Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf depended on civilian politicians for legitimacy, these political actors often collaborated with authoritarian rulers for short-term benefits. Rather than resisting undemocratic rule, many politicians lent credibility to military regimes, undermining their own long-term authority. The creation of the Convention Muslim League under Ayub, the Pakistan National Alliance’s alliance with Zia, and the PML-Q’s support for Musharraf all exemplify this pattern.
Following the return to civilian rule in 2008, there was hope that democratic continuity might finally take root. However, successive civilian governments failed to reform key institutions, particularly the civil bureaucracy and security establishment, to ensure a balance of power. The failure to bring the intelligence agencies under parliamentary oversight, the continued dominance of the military in foreign and security policymaking, and the lack of civilian control over strategic economic projects such as CPEC signaled the persistence of civilian weakness. Even after the 18th Amendment, which granted greater provincial autonomy and sought to rebalance institutional power, core areas such as defense, foreign affairs, and internal security remained firmly under military influence.
Moreover, political parties themselves failed to evolve as democratic institutions. Instead of promoting internal democracy and ideological development, they became vehicles of dynastic leadership and patronage distribution. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), despite their decades-long political legacy, have remained family-led enterprises. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which emerged as a third force, also concentrated power in the hands of its leader, sidelining institutional structures within the party. This personalization of politics weakened democratic accountability and hindered the emergence of policy-based politics.
Another critical factor has been the weakening of parliamentary sovereignty. From 2008 to 2023, parliamentary attendance remained dismally low, with some legislators attending less than 10 percent of sessions, and crucial bills were often passed through ordinances rather than debate and consensus-building. The trend of bypassing parliamentary debate has eroded the role of elected representatives in shaping national policy. Furthermore, media sensationalism and judicial overreach have sometimes filled the vacuum left by weak civilian leadership, adding further complexity to governance.
The judiciary’s role, too, reflects the shifting sands of civilian authority. While judicial activism has sometimes exposed corruption and inefficiency, it has also destabilized elected governments. The disqualification of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani in 2012 and Nawaz Sharif in 2017 were seen by many as politicized interventions rather than purely legal decisions. The lack of judicial consistency and selective application of accountability measures has further weakened civilian credibility in the eyes of the public.
The growing role of unelected centers of power such as the establishment, judiciary, and even international donors and financial institutions underscores how far civilian supremacy has eroded. This decline is not only a result of external manipulation but also internal apathy and misgovernance. Democratic resilience cannot be built unless elected representatives show a commitment to reform, transparency, and institutional strengthening. Civil-military imbalance is only a part of the problem. The crisis of democratic consolidation in Pakistan stems equally from the failures of the civilian political elite.
CSS Solved Past Papers from 2010 to Date by Miss Iqra Ali
Explore CSS solved past papers (2010 to Date) by Miss Iqra Ali, featuring detailed answers, examiner-focused content, and updated solutions. Perfect for aspirants preparing for CSS with accuracy and confidence.
Yet despite repeated failures, the path to recovery remains open. Democratic continuity since 2008, though marred by inefficiency and instability, has allowed for a reimagining of institutional reform. The strengthening of the Election Commission, increased judicial scrutiny over electoral processes, and greater civil society engagement reflect a growing political consciousness. However, unless political parties democratize from within, invest in governance reforms, and prioritize institutional development over short-term populism, the decline of civilian supremacy will continue.
Pakistan’s future hinges not merely on military withdrawal from politics but on the ability of civilian actors to reclaim, rebuild, and responsibly wield democratic authority. The restoration of parliamentary supremacy, bureaucratic neutrality, and policy continuity is essential for long-term stability. Without these corrections, Pakistan risks remaining a state governed by shadows rather than by an empowered and accountable democratic order.
