In the current global environment, the stability of a country’s political structure determines not only its internal development but also its place among nations. Political stability reinforces institutional continuity and economic direction, whereas instability diminishes a state’s capacity to govern, invites institutional decay, and leaves it vulnerable to both domestic unrest and foreign pressure. Pakistan, unfortunately, remains ensnared in a cycle of political instability that has repeatedly undermined its democratic foundations, economic potential, and state legitimacy.
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Over the decades, Pakistan's political trajectory has reflected a disjointed and unsettled reality. The country's leadership vacuum following the death of its founder in 1948 set the tone for a fragmented political system, where power passed swiftly from one government to another. The Muslim League, which had spearheaded the independence movement, failed to evolve into a cohesive national force. As a result, between 1947 and 1958, seven different civilian governments collapsed one after another, each unable to maintain political balance or command the cooperation of regional forces. This weakness at the civilian level paved the way for the military's intervention, beginning with President Iskandar Mirza and General Ayub Khan. Political parties were either co-opted or suppressed, and a controlled form of political engagement was devised, carefully curated to benefit the ruling establishment.
This pattern continued into the 1970s and proved disastrous in 1971, when the inability of West Pakistani leaders to acknowledge the electoral mandate of the Awami League in East Pakistan culminated in the dismemberment of the country. The violence and repression that followed the refusal to transfer power not only marked the loss of East Pakistan but also confirmed the dangers of ethnic denial and authoritarian control. What followed was a return to civilian rule under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, but his tenure too deteriorated into a personalized power structure. Once again, the military stepped in, and General Zia-ul-Haq's regime extended over a decade, using religious slogans to consolidate power and systematically erode civil institutions. Despite his promises of returning to civilian rule, the political order remained engineered from above, and the suppression of political rivals continued without interruption.
Following Zia’s death, the return of civilian governments in the 1990s did not yield the political maturity many had hoped for. Instead, Pakistan fell back into the hands of two dynastic political parties, each exploiting state machinery for personal advantage. The Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) alternated in power, but neither displayed the capacity to run a government that could complete its tenure without controversy or collapse. Elections were contested not on policy or governance but on personalities and vendettas. Coalition politics, driven by short-term alliances and opportunistic calculations, became the new normal. It is telling that in over seventy-seven years, not a single elected prime minister of Pakistan has completed a full five-year term of office.
The instability was further deepened by regional disparities. The dominance of Punjab within the national political framework created resentment in smaller provinces, and this translated into ethnicized politics where parties sought to secure regional strongholds at the expense of national unity. Political alliances rarely lasted longer than the interests that forged them. While the PPP dominated Sindh, JUI gained ground in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Punjab became the battleground between PML-N and PTI. This ethnopolitical fragmentation made it difficult to reach national consensus, even on fundamental constitutional or economic matters.
Meanwhile, the structure of political parties themselves remained hollow. Most parties were vehicles for a single family or individual, rarely engaging in institutional development. Intra-party elections, where they happened at all, were largely symbolic. The Election Commission of Pakistan, although tasked with overseeing democratic processes, lacked the authority and independence to enforce meaningful oversight. According to Ishrat Hussain in his book Governing the Ungovernable, apart from Jamaat-e-Islami, no major political party has held regular and fair intra-party elections as required by law. This failure ensured that party leadership remained insulated from internal criticism, resistant to reform, and dependent on clientelist networks.
Political patronage became the lifeblood of governance. Whether under military rule or civilian governments, appointments and favors were granted based on loyalty rather than competence. Kinship networks and personal affiliations shaped cabinet formation, bureaucratic appointments, and access to state resources. Anatol Lieven has pointed out that military rulers, though initially claiming to dismantle patronage, eventually relied on the same clientelistic structures to extend their rule and build legitimacy. This practice eroded public trust in the political process and fostered a sense of alienation among ordinary citizens, who saw governance as a matter of elite privilege.
What compounded these issues further was the absence of a responsible opposition. Instead of holding governments accountable through parliamentary mechanisms and constructive criticism, opposition parties often pursued disruption and delegitimization. Politics turned into a battle of attrition, with boycotts, dharnas, and parliamentary walkouts replacing debate and legislation. The culture of tolerance and dialogue, essential to any democracy, remained absent. As political analyst Anwar Syed noted, the feudalistic nature of many Pakistani politicians leads to an intolerance of dissent, an expectation of subservience, and a disregard for democratic process. This mindset, deeply entrenched across party lines, hindered the emergence of a mature democratic ethos.
Institutionally, Pakistan remained vulnerable to intervention. Every time a government faltered, the military appeared as the only organized institution capable of stepping in. This recurring pattern of military takeover, seen in 1958, 1969, 1979, and 1999, shaped a political culture where the authority of elected governments was always seen as provisional. Civilian institutions, undermined by decades of manipulation and sidelining, failed to build the resilience necessary for long-term governance. Even when the military was not formally in power, its influence over foreign policy, internal security, and key economic decisions remained decisive, often overriding civilian prerogatives.
To shift the political landscape from instability toward sustainability, foundational changes are required. Pakistan’s political parties must transform into democratic institutions, not dynastic platforms. This requires institutionalized mechanisms of leadership selection, internal accountability, and grassroots participation. If elections are held at the tehsil level, and if party offices are filled through open, competitive processes, merit can begin to displace personal loyalty. Over time, this could break the existing elite stranglehold over politics and allow competent, issue-based leadership to rise.
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Simultaneously, constitutional amendments must empower neutral institutions like the Election Commission to scrutinize and regulate intra-party elections. Without transparency at the party level, the entire democratic process is compromised. Reforms to Article 63A must go beyond punishing floor-crossers by strengthening deterrents against party-hopping and horse-trading, both of which undermine political coherence and public confidence. National integrity can only be promoted when regional representation does not come at the expense of federal harmony. In this regard, constitutional boundaries should be drawn that restrict parties from exploiting provincial fault lines for political gain.
The problem is not merely the repetition of history but the persistence of an entrenched political culture that thrives on disorder, rewards corruption, and fears reform. Pakistan's democratic journey has been too long delayed by these recurring flaws, yet the possibility of course correction still exists. Through political and constitutional reform, and by building parties that are inclusive, accountable, and resilient, Pakistan can reclaim the promise of representative governance. The cost of inaction is clear. Without reform, the cycles of crisis will persist, and the public’s faith in democracy will continue to erode. But if a sincere commitment is made to overhaul the political system from the ground up, the country can begin to rebuild a more stable and just political order.
