When Pakistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017, it did so at a time of great uncertainty and opportunity in global politics. The unipolar moment had long passed, replaced by multipolar ambitions and regional realignments. The SCO, once a modest security grouping founded by China, Russia, and Central Asian republics, had steadily grown in prominence. For Islamabad, the timing seemed opportune, an invitation to participate in a bloc driven by eastern powers and designed to chart a path independent of Western alliances. Yet, with all the promise came a set of constraints that continue to test Pakistan’s diplomatic deftness, internal cohesion, and geopolitical balancing act.
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It is no secret that Pakistan's geostrategic location has long made it an object of global interest. Sitting at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, the country enjoys a vantage position that facilitates connectivity, energy pipelines, and trade corridors. Its access to warm waters, especially the deep-sea port of Gwadar, complements the landlocked ambitions of Central Asian states. Within the SCO framework, this locational utility becomes even more pronounced. States like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan seek maritime gateways, and Pakistan offers them the shortest route to the Arabian Sea.
This natural advantage, however, does not operate in isolation. It is intricately linked to the ability of the state to maintain security, political continuity, and functional infrastructure. Opportunities, in this context, are not just about geography; they are about readiness. For example, the SCO’s potential to facilitate economic growth for Pakistan depends not only on access to member markets but also on whether Pakistan can deliver competitive goods and maintain consistent policy frameworks that assure investors. Here, the gap between opportunity and reality begins to widen.
There is little doubt that trade within the SCO framework can bolster Pakistan’s fragile economy. The member states represent vast markets, energy wealth, and industrial capabilities. Pakistan’s textile and agricultural sectors, long stifled by inconsistent export strategies, could find new buyers among the Central Asian republics. Energy partnerships, especially with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, offer the tantalizing possibility of easing Pakistan’s chronic energy shortages. Cooperation on this front could strengthen Pakistan’s manufacturing base and, in turn, stimulate job creation and export diversification.
Moreover, the SCO is not merely about commerce; it is also a mechanism of technological cooperation. In an era where digital literacy, innovation, and climate adaptation dictate national progress, Pakistan’s partnerships with technologically advanced members like China and Russia could be game-changing. Joint ventures in renewable energy, vocational training, and digital infrastructure may uplift Pakistan’s services sector, enabling its large youth population to enter the labor force with modern skills. However, to translate memoranda into material gains, Pakistan must tackle its domestic structural inefficiencies, particularly in education and human development.
On the geopolitical front, the SCO offers Pakistan a multilateral arena where its diplomatic voice can resonate beyond traditional alignments. At a time when its relations with the United States and Europe have grown increasingly transactional, the SCO allows Pakistan to deepen its ties with regional powers on matters of mutual interest, be it counterterrorism, trade, or climate action. Furthermore, within this organization, Islamabad can highlight long-standing issues like the Kashmir dispute or advocate for the rights of the Palestinians without fear of marginalization. Such platforms offer not just relevance but also legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the picture is not without blemish. One of the most significant challenges for Pakistan within the SCO is India’s simultaneous presence. Though both countries joined the organization at the same time, their trajectories and strategic motives differ considerably. While India views the SCO as a means to counterbalance China's growing footprint in regional affairs, Pakistan often finds itself aligned with Chinese visions of connectivity and regional security. This ideological friction often hampers the effectiveness of SCO deliberations, particularly when consensus is required.
India’s growing hostility toward Pakistan within and outside the SCO remains a formidable hurdle. Attempts by New Delhi to isolate Islamabad diplomatically, through rhetoric and lobbying, have complicated Pakistan’s efforts to present itself as a constructive member of the international community. For instance, India’s objection to Pakistan’s potential inclusion in other multilateral forums like BRICS reveals a persistent campaign to limit Islamabad’s global space. Within the SCO, where decisions rely on unanimity, this antagonism often translates into strategic gridlock.
Adding to the geopolitical tightrope is Pakistan’s delicate relationship with the West. The SCO, led by China and Russia, is often perceived by Western capitals as a counterbalance to NATO and the broader transatlantic alliance. While the SCO explicitly states its non-aligned status, its undertones of multipolarity and resistance to unilateralism often provoke suspicion. For Pakistan, which still relies on Western financial institutions and occasionally seeks military and economic cooperation with the United States, maintaining equidistance between East and West remains a sensitive enterprise. Leaning too far in either direction could jeopardize critical partnerships.
Internally, Pakistan faces another set of complications that may undermine its SCO ambitions. Chief among them is political instability. Frequent changes in government, polarizing electoral environments, and ad hoc foreign policy decisions create uncertainty that foreign partners find difficult to navigate. Regional cooperation thrives on predictability, and Pakistan’s recent political churn has eroded its image as a dependable interlocutor. Without internal political cohesion and consistent diplomatic messaging, Pakistan’s commitments within the SCO may appear unconvincing.
Security remains another pivotal concern. While the SCO has mechanisms such as the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) to facilitate cooperation on counterterrorism, Pakistan must demonstrate its ability to secure both its own territory and foreign investments. Recent attacks on Chinese workers and foreign engineers involved in infrastructure projects have raised alarms across SCO member states. These incidents do not merely damage bilateral trust; they threaten the entire narrative of regional connectivity that Pakistan hopes to champion through platforms like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
The Afghan situation further complicates matters. Pakistan’s proximity to and influence over Kabul renders it an indispensable actor in shaping regional security. However, the Taliban’s return to power, coupled with Pakistan’s limited leverage over their internal decisions, has made it difficult for Islamabad to deliver on promises of regional stability. While the SCO encourages dialogue with Kabul, any long-term settlement depends on Pakistan’s capacity to balance security concerns with diplomatic engagement. The absence of a coherent Afghan policy will only diminish Pakistan’s utility within the SCO framework.
Furthermore, Islamabad’s tendency to interpret multilateralism through a security lens often limits the scope of its participation. The SCO is not merely a counterterrorism alliance; it is also a hub for cultural, technological, and environmental cooperation. Pakistan’s involvement in these sectors remains limited and often symbolic. If it continues to underutilize the organization’s broader agenda, it risks being seen not as a contributor to regional progress but as a beneficiary of security aid.
There is, however, a path forward. To truly benefit from its SCO membership, Pakistan must embrace a long-term view of regional integration. This means investing in human capital, reforming its bureaucracy to facilitate cross-border trade, and prioritizing the completion of regional infrastructure. Furthermore, it must communicate clearly to both Western and Eastern partners that its participation in the SCO is guided not by bloc politics but by shared interests in development, stability, and mutual respect.
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Pakistan must also recalibrate its approach to India within the SCO. While bilateral tensions are unlikely to dissipate overnight, Islamabad should explore backchannel diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges that might, over time, soften hostility and create pockets of cooperation. The SCO, unlike other rigid institutions, allows for such flexibility. To waste that potential would be a diplomatic misstep.
In conclusion, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization offers Pakistan a meaningful platform to redefine its regional role, diversify its economy, and contribute to collective security. Yet, the journey from membership to meaningful influence is long and fraught with challenges, internal dysfunction, external hostilities, and the perpetual dilemma of balancing global alignments. It is now up to Pakistan’s leadership, civil, military, and diplomatic, to determine whether the country will rise to the occasion or let another opportunity slip through its fingers. The time for symbolism has passed. What is needed now is strategy, substance, and sustained engagement. Only then can the promise of SCO membership be transformed into national progress.
