In tracing the development of Pakistan’s Islamic orientation, one must confront the intricate web of religious, political, and institutional currents that shaped its national identity. At the time of independence, Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, articulated a vision of a modern Muslim state where religion would not serve as the basis of exclusion or governance. However, in the years following partition, political opportunism, weak democratic structures, and regional insecurities created fertile ground for the ascendancy of religious identity in state affairs. This transformation was neither linear nor universally accepted, but it slowly grew dominant in the national discourse, gradually moving Pakistan away from Jinnah’s original conception of a pluralistic Muslim polity.
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As early as March 1949, the passage of the Objectives Resolution by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan marked a critical shift in the ideological trajectory of the country. Although it framed sovereignty as belonging to Allah, its interpretation was not immediately rigid or exclusionary. Over time, however, this document became the cornerstone of Islamic legitimacy in Pakistani law and politics. The Objectives Resolution was inserted into the Constitution as a preamble, but under General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule, it was made a substantive part of the Constitution. This shift had profound implications for legislation, the judiciary, and the treatment of religious minorities. The 1973 Constitution, while inclusive in its drafting, already contained Islamic provisions such as the declaration of Islam as the state religion and the requirement for both the President and Prime Minister to be Muslim. These provisions would later be interpreted more rigidly under military regimes.
The most decisive moment in Pakistan’s Islamization came under the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq. Following the military coup in 1977, Zia found in Islam a tool for legitimizing his authoritarian rule. His regime introduced sweeping changes in the legal and institutional framework of the country. The Hudood Ordinances, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, and the establishment of the Federal Shariat Court redefined the relationship between the state and its citizens through a religious lens. Zia’s Islamization policies led to the institutionalization of sectarian divisions, with discriminatory laws against the Ahmadiyya community, particularly the 1984 Ordinance XX, creating legal exclusion and social hostility. The state’s use of religion under Zia not only undermined the neutrality of law but also altered the public imagination of who belonged in the national fold.
In addition to laws and institutions, the curriculum of public education was also transformed to promote a specific Islamic identity, often at the expense of Pakistan’s multicultural and multi-sectarian reality. The emphasis on jihad, martyrdom, and the superiority of Islamic civilization over others permeated textbooks, which were designed not just for learning but for ideological conditioning. By the late 1980s, textbooks across Pakistan systematically marginalized non-Muslim contributions to the country’s history and framed Pakistan’s genesis almost exclusively in Islamic terms. This intellectual framework has continued to affect how generations of Pakistanis understand their past and their neighbors, particularly in relation to India and the West.
The impact of this religious tilt is not confined to law and education alone. Pakistan’s foreign policy during the Afghan jihad also became deeply entangled with religious ideology. Under Zia, Pakistan emerged as a frontline state in the US-led effort to resist the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This alliance brought financial and military aid, but it also opened the gates to militant religious networks. Madrassas in Pakistan, funded by Gulf countries and facilitated by intelligence agencies, became recruitment and training centers for jihad. By the 1990s, the proliferation of religious militancy, including the rise of sectarian outfits and Taliban factions, had become an enduring internal threat, exacerbated by the state’s ambiguous stance towards these groups.
Even after Zia’s death, successive civilian and military governments have struggled to decisively disentangle religion from the affairs of state. The blasphemy laws, particularly Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, remain among the most controversial legacies of Zia’s regime. These laws are often misused to target religious minorities and settle personal disputes, with little room for legal recourse. Public debate around their reform is muted by the fear of violent backlash, as witnessed in the assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in 2011 for supporting a Christian woman accused of blasphemy. The weaponization of religious sentiment has led to a dangerous erosion of pluralism and the rule of law.
The democratic process too has been undermined by the state’s religious posture. Islamist parties, while rarely securing majority votes, have been given disproportionate influence due to their capacity to mobilize street power. The state, often wary of political instability, has entered into tacit arrangements with these groups. As a result, policies that might otherwise prioritize economic reform, human development, or federal harmony have often been delayed or diluted by ideological concerns. This has also affected Pakistan’s international image, limiting trade opportunities, foreign investment, and diplomatic credibility.
Furthermore, the politicization of religion has fueled sectarian violence across Pakistan, particularly between Sunni and Shia communities. The nexus between extremist groups, some of which have enjoyed state patronage in the past, and electoral calculations has created a toxic environment for social cohesion. Minority communities including Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Ahmadis live under constant insecurity, often targeted by both mobs and legal systems. This internal fragmentation continues to weaken Pakistan’s national unity.
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Despite this trajectory, there have been moments and voices of resistance. Civil society, independent journalists, and some political leaders have raised questions about the cost of intertwining religion with governance. The judiciary, on occasion, has delivered rulings that favor human rights over religious populism. Pakistan’s youth, particularly in urban centers, increasingly challenge conservative narratives through art, literature, and activism. However, these counter-currents remain fragile in the face of entrenched institutional and ideological structures.
To move towards a more inclusive and democratic future, Pakistan must undertake a deliberate and sustained re-evaluation of the role religion plays in its public life. A return to the constitutional spirit that values equality of citizenship over religious identity is imperative. This requires not just legal reforms but also a transformation in education, media, and governance practices. Only then can Pakistan begin to reconcile its rich diversity with its Islamic heritage in a way that promotes justice, peace, and progress for all its citizens.
