In the wake of one of the darkest days in its recent history, Pakistan found itself standing at a crossroads. The attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014, which claimed the lives of over 140 schoolchildren and teachers, marked a turning point in the country’s struggle against terrorism. It was not the first such attack, nor was it the deadliest in a region long plagued by extremism, but it broke the nation’s collective heart and galvanized a response that had long been deferred. Out of the ashes of that tragedy emerged the National Action Plan (NAP), a twenty-point blueprint designed to stabilize Pakistan’s internal security and root out terrorism and extremism in all its forms.
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This plan, although launched with considerable urgency, was not just a military initiative. It sought to redefine the contours of Pakistan’s internal security framework through legal reforms, community engagement, religious discourse regulation, and financial accountability. And while several of its objectives were ambitious, some gains were undeniable in the years that followed. Yet, with each success came new challenges, and the reality of implementation often fell short of aspiration.
To understand the evolution and effectiveness of NAP, it is important to situate it in Pakistan’s broader security context. Since 2004, the country had been grappling with waves of violence inflicted by terrorist outfits like Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Al-Qaeda, and various sectarian militias. These groups not only targeted civilians and law enforcement, but also launched coordinated attacks on minority communities, sacred religious sites, and state institutions. The fragile security landscape, particularly in border regions adjoining Afghanistan, was made even more volatile by porous frontiers, unregulated seminaries, and unchecked terror financing.
It was in response to this multi-layered threat matrix that NAP emerged as a unifying national doctrine against terrorism. By the time the plan was announced, Pakistan had already launched major military operations such as Zarb-e-Azb, targeting militant strongholds in the tribal belt. The subsequent Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad sought to neutralize residual threats and cleanse urban centers of sleeper cells. These military offensives, though often viewed as the backbone of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy, were only one part of the larger equation outlined by NAP.
Indeed, the reduction in terrorism-related fatalities since 2015 has been notable. Reports indicate that by 2020, deaths from terrorist violence had dropped by over 85 percent compared to the peak levels of 2013. Areas like North Waziristan, once considered safe havens for foreign and domestic terrorists, witnessed a marked decline in organized militancy. In parallel, regions such as Balochistan and Karachi experienced a relative improvement in law and order. These gains were attributed to intelligence-led operations, joint efforts by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and coordinated surveillance, which collectively disrupted terror networks.
Moreover, under NAP, law enforcement underwent significant institutional reforms. Specialized units such as the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) were restructured and expanded across all provinces. Equipped with enhanced legal authority, better training, and modern equipment, these units played a pivotal role in capturing high-value targets and dismantling militant cells. In Punjab alone, hundreds of raids led to the arrest of operatives linked with banned outfits. Over 40,000 intelligence-based operations (IBOs) were conducted nationwide between 2015 and 2020. These results, while laudable, also exposed critical gaps in inter-agency coordination and the need for further investment in surveillance and forensic capacities.
Parallel to the military and policing response, NAP also focused on cutting off the financial arteries of terrorism. This included stringent measures to track and freeze bank accounts linked to proscribed organizations, monitor informal money transfer systems (such as hawala and hundi), and align national regulations with global standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The crackdown on terror financing bore fruit when, after years of persistent lobbying and legal reform, Pakistan was removed from the FATF grey list in 2022. The establishment of Terror Financing Investigation Units (TFIUs) within both the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and provincial CTDs provided institutional support to sustain this momentum.
Another domain in which NAP aimed to bring structural change was the regulation of religious seminaries (madrasas) and the narrative surrounding extremist ideologies. For decades, madrasas had operated outside the purview of standardized curricula or financial oversight, becoming breeding grounds for radical thought in some cases. Under NAP, efforts were made to register and map these institutions, introduce uniform syllabi, and track foreign funding. Legal amendments were also enacted to curb hate speech and incitement to violence. While more than 30,000 madrasas were reportedly brought under government supervision by 2019, challenges remained. Implementation was inconsistent across provinces, and strong resistance from religious lobbies diluted the intended reforms.
That said, some promising initiatives focused on deradicalization and rehabilitation. The Sabaoon Center in Swat is a case in point. Designed to rehabilitate youth formerly indoctrinated or forcibly recruited by militant groups, the center combined counseling, vocational training, and reintegration support. Thousands of beneficiaries passed through this and similar programs with renewed prospects for education or employment. Projects like these underscored the importance of addressing the socio-psychological dimensions of extremism, beyond mere physical elimination of militants.
Still, even with these advances, a deeper analysis reveals that NAP was hampered by structural inefficiencies and policy inertia. In many instances, the absence of a clear chain of command, overlapping jurisdictions, and the lack of parliamentary oversight weakened its long-term effectiveness. While NAP envisioned a whole-of-government approach, in practice, it often tilted heavily toward militarized solutions, sidelining the softer components of the plan such as community engagement, civic education, and socio-economic uplift.
The broader context in which terrorism thrives, namely poverty, unemployment, injustice, and political disenfranchisement, was not addressed with equal urgency. Educational reforms, judicial overhauls, and infrastructural investment in underdeveloped regions proceeded at a sluggish pace. Moreover, selective enforcement of laws and perceived impunity for certain banned outfits undermined public trust and sent conflicting signals regarding the state’s commitment to counter-extremism.
In addition, some critical institutions such as the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) remained underfunded and politically sidelined. Despite being envisioned as a central coordinating body, NACTA struggled to assert its authority over security policymaking. Without adequate resources and independence, the agency was unable to drive the strategic vision of NAP or ensure that all stakeholders remained aligned.
Another overlooked element was the digital and ideological battlefield. The rise of social media as a recruitment and propaganda tool for extremist groups required robust cyber surveillance and counter-narrative campaigns. While sporadic efforts were made to monitor online spaces, a comprehensive digital strategy remained elusive. Civil society participation in building resilient communities and promoting pluralistic values also did not receive the institutional support it warranted.
Looking forward, the future of internal security in Pakistan depends on how the state recalibrates its counter-terrorism paradigm. Force alone is not sufficient. There must be a renewed emphasis on structural reforms, judicial, educational, and administrative—that address the root causes of radicalization. Engagement with marginalized communities, investment in youth development, and strengthening of local governance are equally vital.
Furthermore, ensuring the transparency and continuity of policy implementation, regardless of changes in political leadership, is critical. Success stories like the FATF delisting and the operational effectiveness of CTDs provide blueprints for what coordinated, accountable governance can achieve. Building on these successes while correcting past missteps offers the best chance to consolidate peace.
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Ultimately, the National Action Plan was a necessary corrective, a wake-up call forged in the aftermath of a national tragedy. It signified a rare moment of political consensus and public resolve. But as time passed, so too did the urgency that had first galvanized its adoption. To let the plan, fade into the background, or to allow bureaucratic fatigue to dull its edge, would be to squander the sacrifices made and the progress achieved.
Pakistan’s fight against extremism is far from over. But if the lessons of NAP are heeded—if the spirit of collective action and strategic clarity is rekindled, the nation may yet realize its vision of a safer, more stable, and inclusive society. The road ahead may be long, but the direction, now more than ever, must be firm.
