Outline
1. Introduction
2. Historical Background of the Israel-Palestine Conflict
2.1. The Foundational Conflict (1948-1967)
- 2.1.1. The 1948 War and the Nakba
- 2.1.2. The 1967 Six-Day War and the Occupation
2.2. The Rise & Fall of the Peace Process and The Emergence of Hamas (1990s-2005)
- 2.2.1. The Oslo Accords (1993)
- 2.2.2. The Second Intifada (2000-2005)
- 2.2.3. The Rise of Hamas
2.3. The Gaza-Specific Context (2005-2022)
- 2.3.1. Israel's 2005 Disengagement
- 2.3.2. The 2007 Hamas Takeover and the Blockade
- 2.3.3. The Cycle of "Mowing the Lawn"
2.4. The Immediate Pre-War Environment (2022-2023)
- 2.4.1. Political Stalemate and Diplomatic Abandonment
- 2.4.2. Rise of the Far-Right in Israel
- 2.4.3. Hamas's Strategic Calculus
3. Why the Two-State Solution for the Israel-Palestine Conflict is Not Possible Now?
3.1. The Geographic Death of a Palestinian State
- 3.1.1. The Unravelling of Territory by Israeli Settlements
- 3.1.2. The De Facto Annexation of Jerusalem
- 3.1.3. The Security Infrastructure as a Permanent Border
3.2. The Collapse of Political Will and Leadership
- 3.2.1. The Political Shift within Israel
- 3.2.2. The Enduring Palestinian Political Division
3.3. The Erosion of External Levers
- 3.3.1. The Abraham Accords and Regional Realignment
- 3.3.2. Waning and Ineffective International Pressure
3.4. The De Facto One-State and the "No Alternative" Fallacy
- 3.4.1. The Status Quo is a One-State Reality
- 3.4.2. Why "No Other Alternative" is a Flawed Argument
4. Exploring Alternatives and Defining a New Way Forward
4.1. Critical Analysis of Alternative Models
- 4.1.1. The One-State Solution
- Idealistic Version of Democratic and Binational State
- De Facto Version of an Apartheid State
- 4.1.2. Confederation (Israel-Palestine or with Jordan)
- 4.1.3. "Economic Peace" or Shrinking the Conflict
4.2. The Way Forward
- 4.2.1. From a State-Building to a Rights-Based Approach
- 4.2.2. A New Role for the International Community
- End the "Zombie Diplomacy"
- Enforce International Law
- 4.2.3. Empowering Civil Society
5. Conclusion
1. Introduction
For decades, the two-state solution -envisioning an independent State of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital alongside Israel based on 1967 borders- was the central pillar of international diplomacy and a symbol of hope for peace. However, this long-held vision now represents a profound divergence between diplomatic rhetoric and lived reality, creating what the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace calls a "diplomatic fiction." Despite continued international endorsement, the two-state solution has transitioned from a difficult possibility to an impossible political fiction, rendered obsolete by three key factors: the irreversible creation of 'facts on the ground' through massive settlement expansion that has geographically dismantled a contiguous Palestinian state; a profound collapse of political will and leadership on both sides to pursue a historic compromise; and a fundamental shift in regional and international dynamics that has eroded external pressure. Consequently, this analysis will argue that the two-state solution is no longer viable and will confront the de facto one-state reality that has emerged, proposing a necessary paradigm shift from a defunct state-building project to a rights-based approach for all people living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.
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2. Historical Background of the Israel-Palestine Conflict
2.1. The Foundational Conflict (1948-1967)
2.1.1. The 1948 War and the Nakba
The modern conflict began with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which led to the establishment of the State of Israel. For Israelis, this was a war of independence and survival. For Palestinians, it is known as the Nakba, or "catastrophe," which resulted in the displacement of over 700,000 Palestinians who became refugees in neighboring countries and within the territories of what would become the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This event created the core, unresolved issue of Palestinian refugees and their descendants' "right of return."
2.1.2. The 1967 Six-Day War and the Occupation
This was the most consequential turning point for the current conflict's geography. In a decisive victory, Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria. This began the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, placing millions of Palestinians under Israeli rule. UN Security Council Resolution 242 called for the "withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" in exchange for peace, establishing the "land for peace" formula that would underpin all future negotiations.
2.2. The Rise & Fall of the Peace Process and the Emergence of Hamas (1990s-2005)
2.2.1. The Oslo Accords (1993)
A moment of unprecedented hope, the Oslo Accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA), a semi-autonomous governing body led by Yasser Arafat's Fatah party. The accords were intended as an interim step toward a final two-state solution. However, they failed to resolve core issues like the status of Jerusalem, final borders, Israeli settlements, and refugees. During this period, Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem accelerated, creating "facts on the ground" that many Palestinians saw as a violation of the spirit of the accords.
2.2.2. The Second Intifada (2000-2005)
The collapse of the Camp David Summit in 2000 was followed by the Second Intifada, a period of intense Palestinian uprising and Israeli military response. This wave of violence, characterized by suicide bombings and large-scale Israeli military operations, shattered the trust built during the Oslo years. It led Israel to construct the West Bank Barrier, a network of walls and fences that separated Israel from the West Bank but also cut deep into Palestinian territory.
2.2.3. The Rise of Hamas
Founded in 1987 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) offered a radical alternative to Fatah's diplomatic approach. Its charter called for the liberation of all of historic Palestine and rejected negotiations with Israel. Hamas gained popularity by providing social services and casting itself as an incorruptible force of armed resistance, particularly as Palestinians grew disillusioned with the PA's perceived corruption and failure to deliver statehood.
2.3. The Gaza-Specific Context (2005-2022)
2.3.1. Israel's 2005 Disengagement
In a deeply contentious decision in 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and military personnel from within the Gaza Strip. Despite this "disengagement," it preserved overarching control over Gaza's external boundaries, airspace, and coastal waters. This maintained Israeli authority over the movement of people and goods, with the exception of the Rafah crossing into Egypt, and continued its ability to conduct military operations in the territory. Consequently, international bodies like the United Nations have continued to classify Gaza as occupied territory under international law. A key piece of evidence supporting this is found in the disengagement plan itself, which, as Human Rights Watch noted, would leave Israel in control of Gaza's borders, coastline, and airspace. This retention of control has had profound and lasting consequences for the residents of Gaza.
2.3.2. The 2007 Hamas Takeover and the Blockade
Following Hamas's victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and its subsequent seizure of full control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Israel and Egypt imposed a strict land, air, and sea blockade on the territory. Israel's stated rationale was to prevent Hamas from importing weapons and to apply pressure on its rule. The impact on Gaza was devastating, leading to the collapse of its economy, soaring unemployment rates often near 50%, widespread poverty, and a profound humanitarian crisis. This situation has led prominent organizations, including Human Rights Watch, to condemn the policy, with the organization stating that the blockade amounts to "the collective punishment of Gaza’s population" and has turned the territory into what many describe as an "open-air prison."
2.3.3. The Cycle of "Mowing the Lawn"
From 2008 to 2021, a deadly pattern emerged. Hamas and other militant groups would fire rockets into Israel, prompting overwhelming Israeli military operations, e.g., in 2008-09, 2012, 2014, and 2021. These wars resulted in thousands of deaths, primarily Palestinian, and widespread destruction in Gaza. This Israeli strategy was often described as "mowing the lawn" -periodically degrading Hamas's military capabilities without removing it from power, thereby managing the conflict rather than resolving it.
2.4. The Immediate Pre-War Environment (2022-2023)
By 2023, several factors converged to create a highly volatile situation:
2.4.1. Political Stalemate and Diplomatic Abandonment
The two-state solution was widely considered defunct. The Abraham Accords saw several Arab nations normalize relations with Israel, decoupling the Palestinian issue from regional diplomacy. A potential landmark normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia was on the horizon, which Hamas and many Palestinians saw as a final betrayal that would sideline their cause indefinitely.
2.4.2. Rise of the Far-Right in Israel
Israel was governed by its most right-wing, religiously conservative coalition in history. This government accelerated settlement expansion in the West Bank, and prominent ministers openly rejected Palestinian statehood. There was a surge in settler violence against Palestinians and provocative Israeli actions at sensitive holy sites, particularly the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem, a key symbol for Muslims worldwide. Hamas repeatedly cited "defending Al-Aqsa" as a core motivation.
2.4.3. Hamas's Strategic Calculus
From Hamas's perspective, the October 7th attack was likely a calculated move to shatter the status quo. The goals were likely multi-faceted: to scuttle the Israel-Saudi deal, violently re-centre the Palestinian cause on the world stage, capture Israeli hostages to trade for thousands of Palestinian prisoners, and position itself as the undisputed leader of the Palestinian "resistance," exposing the perceived weakness of both the PA and a divided Israel.
3. Why the Two-State Solution for the Israel-Palestine Conflict is Not Possible Now?
3.1. The Geographic Death of a Palestinian State
The most formidable barrier to a two-state solution is no longer ideological but physical. The vision of a viable, contiguous, and sovereign Palestinian state has been systematically dismantled, piece by piece, through a deliberate and expansionist settlement policy. This is not a matter of a few isolated hilltop outposts but a vast, state-sponsored enterprise designed to permanently alter the demographic and geographic reality of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, making a coherent Palestinian state a practical impossibility, a conclusion supported by years of mapping and data from organizations like B'Tselem.
3.1.1. The Unravelling of Territory by Israeli Settlements
At the heart of the geographic impossibility of a Palestinian state is the extensive and ever-expanding network of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. This is not a marginal issue but a massive demographic and geographic transformation. According to Israeli human rights organisation Peace Now, as of early 2024, there are approximately 700,000 Israeli settlers living in at least 146 Israeli-government-authorised settlements and 140 unauthorised outposts in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This represents a massive, ideologically driven population transfer into occupied territory, a clear violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Moreover, these settlements are not randomly placed; their strategic positioning is designed to maximize Israeli control and fragment Palestinian life. Reports by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Palestinian rights group Al-Haq have detailed how settlements are strategically located to control key water resources, fertile agricultural land in the Jordan Valley, and major transportation arteries. This strategic placement carves the West Bank into a series of disconnected Palestinian cantons, which many analysts, including the late Israeli scholar Meron Benvenisti, have long referred to as "Bantustans." This destroys the territorial contiguity essential for a functioning and sovereign state, making free movement and economic development for Palestinians impossible without Israeli permission. The argument that such a large, politically powerful, and ideologically motivated settler population could be evacuated is politically inconceivable for any Israeli government, a point repeatedly made by analysts of Israeli politics.
3.1.2. The De Facto Annexation of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, the emotional and political heart of the conflict, was envisioned as a shared capital under the two-state model, with West Jerusalem for Israel and East Jerusalem for Palestine. This cornerstone has been systematically demolished. Israel’s declaration of a "united, eternal capital" is backed by a decades-long policy of settlement construction and demographic manipulation in and around East Jerusalem. Organizations like Ir Amim and Terrestrial Jerusalem, which monitor developments in the city, have extensively documented how massive settlement blocs like Gilo, Har Homa, and Ramat Shlomo have been built to encircle Palestinian neighborhoods. This "Ring of Settlements" effectively severs East Jerusalem from its West Bank hinterland, particularly the urban centers of Bethlehem and Ramallah. This strategic encirclement, as detailed in Ir Amim’s "Jerusalem annual roundup," is not just about housing; it is about solidifying Israeli control and preventing any future political division of the city. The process has been one of de facto annexation, where Israeli law is applied, municipal services are extended (albeit unequally), and a permanent physical and demographic reality is created that makes drawing a border through the city a practical impossibility. The eviction of Palestinian families in neighborhoods like Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan, based on discriminatory laws analyzed by Human Rights Watch, further serves this goal of demographic transformation. For a Palestinian state to be viable, it requires its capital in East Jerusalem, not just as a symbolic gesture but as the center of its economic, political, and cultural life. The de facto annexation has rendered this a fantasy.
3.1.3. The Security Infrastructure as a Permanent Border
The architecture of occupation has evolved from a temporary military presence into a permanent system of control that has superseded the 1967 Green Line as the de facto border. The most imposing feature of this is the Israeli West Bank Barrier. While Israel maintains it is a temporary security measure, its route deviates significantly from the Green Line, cutting deep into Palestinian territory to enclose major settlement blocs. According to B'Tselem, approximately 85% of the barrier’s route runs inside the West Bank, effectively annexing some 9% of Palestinian land, including fertile agricultural areas and crucial water sources. Complementing the barrier is a multi-layered system of control. OCHA reports hundreds of permanent and "flying" checkpoints, roadblocks, earth mounds, and gates that severely restrict Palestinian freedom of movement, creating what it terms "access restrictions." This matrix of control is further solidified by a network of "bypass roads," modern highways built for Israeli settlers to connect their settlements to Israel proper, often while older roads are restricted for Palestinian use. These roads are not just for convenience; they are arteries of control, ensuring seamless Israeli access while fragmenting Palestinian territory. Finally, vast swathes of the West Bank are designated as closed military zones or nature reserves, further restricting Palestinian development and access to land. This permanent infrastructure, as documented year after year by the UN Secretary-General's reports on the Palestinian question, is not the hallmark of a temporary occupation awaiting a political settlement; it is the architecture of permanent control and annexation, solidifying a border based on demographics and security control, not on the internationally recognized lines of 1967.
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3.2. The Collapse of Political Will and Leadership
A political vacuum mirrors the geographic impossibility of a Palestinian state. On both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, the political will required to negotiate, endorse, and implement a historic two-state compromise has evaporated. The leadership capable of undertaking such a monumental task is absent, replaced by political establishments that are either ideologically opposed to the solution or, as detailed in reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, too weak and divided to pursue it.
3.2.1. The Political Shift within Israel
The Israeli political landscape has undergone a seismic and sustained shift to the right, marginalizing the very idea of Palestinian sovereignty. The mainstream political discourse is no longer centered on the parameters of a two-state solution but on "managing the conflict." Key figures in successive Israeli governments, including from the Likud party and its far-right coalition partners like Otzma Yehudit -Jewish Power- and Religious Zionism, are openly and ideologically hostile to the creation of a Palestinian state in any form. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has publicly stated his goal is to prevent a Palestinian state, declaring that "the hope of the Arabs for a state in Judea and Samaria must be eliminated." This ideological shift is reflected in public opinion. A landmark poll conducted in early 2024 by the Israel Democracy Institute revealed a stark reality: only 31% of the Israeli public now supports the two-state solution. The prevailing paradigm in Israeli security and political circles is no longer about finding a partner for peace but about ensuring security through permanent military control over the West Bank and managing the Palestinian population. The concept of "land for peace" has been replaced by a reality of "peace for peace" -as seen in the Abraham Accords- or, more accurately, security through permanent control. The once-vibrant Israeli peace camp, a powerful political force in the 1990s, is now politically marginal, a fact lamented in analyses by Israeli newspapers like Haaretz.
3.2.2. The Enduring Palestinian Political Division
The Palestinian political arena is equally inhospitable to a two-state solution, characterized by deep division, a crisis of legitimacy, and the absence of a unified leadership with a mandate to negotiate a final peace. The most significant obstacle is the Fatah-Hamas schism. Since the violent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas in 2007, the Palestinians have been governed by two separate, rival polities. This division has created a strategic impasse: with whom does Israel, or the international community, negotiate? As reports from the International Crisis Group consistently highlight, any agreement signed by the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) would be rejected by Hamas, leaving Gaza -a critical component of a future state -outside its scope. Beyond the division, the Palestinian Authority itself suffers from a profound legitimacy crisis. Decades of failed negotiations, coupled with accusations of widespread corruption and authoritarianism, have eroded its standing. Regular polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) consistently shows that a vast majority of Palestinians demand the resignation of President Mahmoud Abbas and view the PA as ineffective. For instance, a March 2024 PSR poll found that 84% of Palestinians are dissatisfied with the PA's performance. A critical source of this delegitimization is the PA's security coordination with Israel, which many Palestinians see as a form of collaboration with the occupation, further undermining its credibility as the leader of a national liberation movement. An institution that lacks a popular mandate is in no position to negotiate or implement a historic peace deal that would require difficult compromises.
3.3. The Erosion of External Levers
The final blows to the two-state solution have come from outside the immediate conflict zone. The regional and international dynamics that once provided a framework of pressure and incentives for a negotiated settlement have fundamentally shifted, leaving the Palestinians more isolated and Israel less constrained than at any point in recent history. This erosion of external levers has been a key theme in analyses by global strategy forums like the Chatham House.
3.3.1. The Abraham Accords and Regional Realignment
The 2020 Abraham Accords, a series of normalization agreements between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, followed by Morocco and Sudan, represent a paradigm shift in Middle East diplomacy. These accords shattered a decades-long Arab consensus, enshrined in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which stipulated that normalization of relations with Israel would only come after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. By formalizing relations with Israel without any tangible progress on the Palestinian track, these Arab nations effectively "decoupled" the Palestinian issue from their own national interests. As analyses from institutions like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have shown, this has had a devastating impact on Palestinian leverage. For decades, the prospect of peace and full normalization with the wider Arab world was the single most significant incentive Israel had to make painful concessions. The Abraham Accords gave Israel a significant part of this prize without requiring it to address the core of the conflict. This has significantly weakened the Palestinian negotiating position and removed a key external pressure point on Israeli decision-making, sending a clear message that the Arab world was prioritizing economic and security cooperation with Israel against shared rivals.
3.3.2. Waning and Ineffective International Pressure
The international architecture that was supposed to shepherd the two-state solution has crumbled due to a lack of will, credibility, and focus. The United States, historically the central mediator, has lost its standing as an impartial broker for many, particularly after the Trump administration's decisions to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move its embassy. While the Biden administration reverted to more traditional rhetoric, it has not reversed these key policies and has been unable to exert meaningful pressure to halt the very "facts on the ground" that make a two-state solution impossible. Simultaneously, the wider international community is suffering from "conflict fatigue." The world is preoccupied with a host of other pressing crises, from the war in Ukraine to great-power competition and climate change. The immense, sustained political capital required to force a breakthrough is simply no longer a priority. This is reflected in tangible ways; a 2024 report by the Norwegian Refugee Council highlighted how funding for the Palestinian crisis has been consistently outstripped by the growing need, demonstrating a clear decline in international prioritization. The era of robust, American-led peace processing is over, and as argued in the journal Foreign Affairs, no other credible actor or coalition of actors has emerged to fill the void. The international community issues statements of concern but lacks the collective will to impose any real costs on the actions that undermine the very solution it purports to support.
3.4. The De Facto One-State and the "No Alternative" Fallacy
The death of the two-state solution has not created a political vacuum. Instead, it has unveiled the reality that has been consolidating for years: a single state under the exclusive control of Israel, where millions of Palestinians live without sovereignty, self-determination, or fundamental rights. Clinging to the mantra of a two-state solution serves to obscure this grim reality and forestall a necessary reckoning with its implications.
3.4.1. The Status Quo is a One-State Reality
Between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, one state -Israel-exercises sovereign control over all territory and all people. It controls borders, security, airspace, currency, and the population registry. Within this single entity, however, rights and status are allocated based on nationality and ethnicity. This has led a growing chorus of legal experts and human rights organizations to conclude that the situation meets the legal definition of apartheid. In its groundbreaking 2021 report, “A regime of Jewish supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This is apartheid,” the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem argued that it no longer makes sense to analyze the situation through the prism of a temporary occupation. This conclusion was echoed by the international organization Human Rights Watch in its report “A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution,” which documented how Israeli policies constitute systematic oppression. Amnesty International followed with its own exhaustive report, “Israel’s Apartheid against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity,” which concluded that Israel maintains this system wherever it has control over Palestinians' rights. These are not just rhetorical flourishes; they are sober legal analyses based on the definitions of apartheid in international law, such as the Apartheid Convention and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
3.4.2. Why "No Other Alternative" is a Flawed Argument
Proponents of the two-state solution often retreat to the argument that it remains the "only game in town," because other alternatives are even more unpalatable. While it is true that alternatives face immense obstacles, the continued verbal endorsement of a defunct two-state solution by international diplomats has become deeply counterproductive. This "zombie diplomacy," a term used by analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations, serves a dangerous function: it provides diplomatic cover for the maintenance and entrenchment of the status quo. By pretending that a process toward a two-state solution still exists, the international community absolves itself of the responsibility to confront Israel's ongoing violations of international law -settlement expansion, de facto annexation, and the denial of basic rights- that are creating the one-state apartheid reality. This diplomatic inertia prevents a necessary and honest reassessment of the situation. It stifles urgent discussions about how to secure the rights and dignity of Palestinians in the reality that currently exists, not the one that was imagined three decades ago. The insistence that there is "no alternative" perpetuates the conflict by allowing the more powerful party to continue consolidating its control under the guise of a peace process that has no prospect of success.
4. Exploring Alternatives and Defining a New Way Forward
The acknowledgement that the two-state solution is no longer viable necessitates a sober analysis of other potential models. While these alternatives are fraught with their own profound challenges, examining them is crucial to understanding the current trajectory and to charting a new path forward that prioritizes justice and human rights over defunct political formulas.
4.1. Critical Analysis of Alternative Models
4.1.1. The One-State Solution
This model has two vastly different interpretations:
Idealistic Version of Democratic and Binational State
This vision of a one-state solution proposes the creation of a single, unified country in the territory of historic Palestine, encompassing all of present-day Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The foundation of this state would be a constitution that guarantees full and equal civil and political rights for every citizen, regardless of their ethnic or religious identity. In this democratic, binational state, both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs would theoretically share political power, control over resources, and national institutions. The aim is to move beyond nationalist division and create a pluralistic society where both peoples can coexist with equal rights and security.
Why it Fails
Despite its appeal to universal democratic values, this model is overwhelmingly rejected by majorities on both sides of the conflict. For the vast majority of Israeli Jews, a single state with a large Palestinian population would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish-majority state, which is the foundational principle of Zionism. This demographic shift is viewed as an existential threat to Israel's identity and security as a Jewish homeland. For many Palestinians, while the promise of equality is attractive, there is a deep-seated fear of becoming a disenfranchised minority within a state whose political, legal, and security institutions were created to serve another national group. They worry that their national and cultural identity would be suppressed and that they would lack genuine political power. This widespread opposition is consistently documented in polling. For example, a March 2024 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) found that only 9% of Palestinians and 23% of Jewish Israelis support this solution. Similarly, a September 2023 survey by the Israel Democracy Institute showed that among Jewish Israelis, support for a two-state solution was significantly higher at 36% compared to the minimal support for a one-state solution with equal rights.
De Facto Version of an Apartheid State
This interpretation argues that a one-state reality already exists, but it is not the democratic ideal. Instead, it is a single state effectively ruled by Israel, where Palestinians are systematically denied sovereignty and equal rights. This de facto reality is characterized by a two-tiered legal and political system that grants superior rights and privileges to Jewish Israelis while imposing a system of military control and legal discrimination upon Palestinians. Several prominent international and Israeli human rights organizations have concluded that this system amounts to apartheid, a crime against humanity under international law. The Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem declared in a landmark 2021 report that Israel operates "a regime of Jewish supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea." This conclusion was echoed by Human Rights Watch, echoing its 2021 apartheid finding, documented in its World Report 2025, the continued killing, starvation, and forcible displacement of nearly all of Gaza's population in 2024. These organizations argue that this is not a temporary situation but a permanent and unjust reality that is legally condemned.
4.1.2. Confederation (Israel-Palestine or with Jordan)
- The Concept of confederation: This model, explored in studies by think tanks like the RAND Corporation and the Brookings Institution, proposes two independent states but with a high degree of integration and shared institutions.
- Why it Fails Now: The primary obstacle is that it requires an even greater degree of mutual trust and political goodwill than the two-state solution. It is a "post-conflict" model, not a path to resolving the current one. With political leaders unwilling to negotiate basic separation, the idea of them collaborating on shared sovereign institutions is politically fanciful.
4.1.3. "Economic Peace" or Shrinking the Conflict
The Concept of Model
This approach, long advocated by various Israeli leaders, including former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, suggests sidestepping the core, seemingly intractable political issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as borders, the status of Jerusalem, and the right of return for refugees. Instead, it focuses on improving the daily lives and economic conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank. The underlying theory is that economic prosperity will lead to stability and reduce the motivation for conflict, thereby "shrinking the conflict" over time until a political solution might become more feasible. This strategy involves measures like issuing more work permits for Palestinians to enter Israel, facilitating industrial zones, and promoting joint economic projects. The goal is to create a more manageable and less violent status quo by prioritizing economic incentives over political negotiations.
Why it Fails
This is a conflict management strategy, not a resolution. Palestinians overwhelmingly reject it as an attempt to normalize and entrench the occupation under a guise of benevolence. A 2023 World Bank report highlights that without a political resolution that addresses restrictions on movement and access, the Palestinian economy remains fundamentally crippled and dependent, making "economic peace" a structural impossibility. It ignores the core demand for self-determination.
4.2. The Way Forward
Given that the traditional solution is dead and the alternatives are non-viable, a fundamental paradigm shift is required. The international community and all relevant actors must move away from a failed state-building framework and adopt a new approach grounded in rights, justice, and accountability.
4.2.1. From a State-Building to a Rights-Based Approach
The international discourse must pivot. Since a separate, viable Palestinian state is no longer a practical possibility, the primary focus can no longer be on borders and territory. The central issue must become the denial of rights to millions of people. This reframes the conflict into a language the world understands and cannot ignore: a struggle for equality, justice, and human dignity. The question is no longer "What will the borders of Palestine be?" but rather, "How can the reality of apartheid and systematic discrimination be dismantled, and how can equality be ensured for all people between the river and the sea?" This reframing is increasingly being championed by human rights advocates and legal scholars cited in publications like the Journal of Palestine Studies.
4.2.2. A New Role for the International Community
The international community must abandon its counterproductive rituals and adopt a new, more assertive role.
End the "Zombie Diplomacy"
The call to end "zombie diplomacy" urges governments to stop paying lip service to the two-state solution, arguing it has become a defunct framework with no realistic chance of implementation. This approach contends that continued international adherence to this "zombie" idea is actively harmful, as it provides diplomatic cover for the entrenchment of a one-state reality characterized by unequal rights and allows the international community to avoid confronting the actual situation on the ground. As argued in analyses from think tanks like the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), this diplomatic inertia prevents the development of effective policies. Therefore, acknowledging the "death" of the traditional two-state paradigm is presented as the necessary first step toward crafting a new, rights-based approach that addresses the existing reality of occupation and inequality rather than pursuing a failed peace process.
Enforce International Law
The approach must shift from mediation to enforcement. For decades, the world has attempted to mediate between two unequal parties. This has failed. The new approach must be centered on upholding international law and demanding accountability for its violation. This includes imposing meaningful consequences for settlement expansion and human rights abuses, as called for by multiple UN Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories.
4.2.3. Empowering Civil Society
With political leaderships on both sides failing, the most significant hope for change lies with grassroots movements. The international community should support and amplify the voices of Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations that are already working together on a framework of equality and co-existence. Groups like B'Tselem, The Parents Circle-Families Forum, and Breaking the Silence are at the forefront of documenting reality and challenging the dominant narratives of their respective societies. As highlighted by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund's peacebuilding programs, investing in these civil society actors is critical for building the foundations of a shared future based on justice from the bottom up.
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5. Conclusion
The two-state solution, for all its historical weight, has been rendered obsolete, suffocated by the concrete of irreversible settlements, starved of the political will confirmed by declining public support on both sides, and abandoned on a world stage realigned by the Abraham Accords. To continue pretending this solution is viable is a counterproductive diplomatic charade that prevents the world from confronting the true nature of the conflict: the de facto reality of a single state, controlled by Israel, that practices systematic discrimination against millions, as legally defined by leading human rights organizations. The conflict is no longer about drawing a border but has become a struggle for rights and equality within this single, deeply unequal political entity. Therefore, the path forward demands a fundamental change in perspective, abandoning failed formulas for a new paradigm based on international law, human rights, and accountability. This means shifting the focus from territory to rights, from mediation to enforcement, and from top-down diplomacy to supporting the grassroots civil society movements that represent the last, best hope for a just future, defined not by a defunct diplomatic process, but by the arduous and essential struggle for equality for all people between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.
Potential CSS and PMS Exam Questions
- "The two-state solution has transitioned from a difficult possibility to a political fiction." Critically evaluate this statement, drawing on the physical, political, and geopolitical arguments presented in the article.
- Analyze the concept of "irreversible facts on the ground" as the primary obstacle to a two-state solution. How have settlement expansion, the de facto annexation of Jerusalem, and the security infrastructure contributed to the "geographic death" of a Palestinian state?
- According to the article, the collapse of the two-state solution reveals a de facto one-state reality. Discuss the characteristics of this reality and evaluate the proposed "paradigm shift" from a state-building framework to a rights-based approach as a way forward.
- "The Abraham Accords and waning international pressure have fatally undermined the two-state solution by eroding external levers." Elaborate on this argument, explaining how shifts in regional and global dynamics have impacted the Israel-Palestine conflict.
